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1. Introduction 
This document concerns IT security in production facilities. It is intended for small and 
medium-sized enterprises that are looking for a simple procedural model for ensur-
ing IT security in production areas. 
 
In order to raise readers’ awareness of IT security in production facilities, security inci-
dents are presented in section  2. It is clear that cyber attacks on production facilities 
in this day and age are not random, but are instead based on a targeted process.  
 
An overview of the most important standards and recommendations on the topic of 
“IT security in production” then follows in section  3. 
 
Section  4 develops a concept for setting up an IT security system for small and medi-
um-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the basis of a ten-point plan. The focus is not only on 
technical measures, but also in particular on the most frequently neglected organiza-
tional measures. 
 
Section  5 then describes the outlook for future requirements and solutions in the 
context of Industry 4.0. 
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2. The Current State of IT Security in Facilities with 
Automation Technology 
This section gives an overview of the current state of IT security in production areas. 
The challenges for today’s production facilities will be identified on the basis of 
known security incidents. The top 10 threats of the German Federal Office for Infor-
mation Security (BSI) will serve as a basis for this. 
2.1. Known Security Incidents in Production Facilities 
The requirements on IT security in production areas are constantly changing. In the 
past IT security incidents in production areas were usually “collateral damage” of or-
dinary malware that accidentally ended up in a production facility. One of the first 
known incidents of this type was the attack on various Daimler Chrysler plants in 2005 
by the malware “Zotob” [PAK2005]. 13 of the company’s plants around the world 
were affected. The damage is estimated at USD 14 million [BYR2009]. 
 
More recent incidents show that malware directed explicitly against production facili-
ties is also being used more and more. The most prominent case to date, “Stuxnet” 
[FAL2011] [LAN2013], was directed against an Iranian uranium enrichment facility. 
This case is presumed to have originated from the US and Israel [BRO2011]. Apart 
from this, further incidents are documented that cannot be ascribed to government 
intervention. For example, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) 
reports a dedicated attack on a blast furnace in Germany, which damaged it 
[BSI2014e]. Furthermore, there now exists malware that attacks components of auto-
mation systems in a targeted fashion. For example, ICS-CERT describes malware that 
attacks OPC servers [CERT2014]. 
 
An attack on the power supply system of Ukraine on 2015-12-23 represents a new 
dimension of cyber attacks on automation systems and critical infrastructure 
[CERT2016]. Three energy providers were attacked at nearly the same time, which led 
to a power outage for 225,000 customers. During the attack, circuit breakers in the 
power grid were operated unchecked via remote access. Data on control computers 
was deleted at the same time. 
 
Besides industrial automation systems, building automation components are affected 
in the same way. A case was documented in 2013 in which heating systems were 
connected to the Internet for the purpose of remote maintenance without sufficient 
security [EIK2013] [STA2013a]. The lack of safeguards allowed external actors to ac-
cess these systems. Although the vulnerability was published in the specialist press 
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and corrected by the manufacturer, a large number of vulnerable heating systems 
were still accessible unsecured on the Internet even two years later [STA2015] The 
users did not install the security updates provided; the equipment remains vulnerable. 
 
The maritime sector must also face the challenges of cyber security. Although the 
automation systems used on ships are bolstered and certified for this special pur-
pose, they are still usually based on conventional automation systems. Thus the same 
threats face these systems as face conventional automation systems [JEN2015]. Fur-
thermore, additional electronic systems for navigation and collision avoidance en-
large the target for potential attackers [DIR2015]. 
 
In what follows this document will address production technology systems of the 
process and manufacturing industry. 
2.2. Future Challenges for IT Security in Production Areas 
Further escalation of the threats to automation systems must be expected in the fu-
ture. This is suggested by the number and development of documented attacks over 
time. The increase in interconnectedness that accompanies Industry 4.0 in order for 
this purpose of realizing horizontal and vertical integration of production processes 
will lead to further possibilities for attacks. In a representative survey by the Al-
lensbach Institute, 88 % of the managers surveyed identify effective protection 
against cyber attacks as the greatest challenge for introducing Industry 4.0 
[DEU2015]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Obstacles and Challenges for the Implementation of Industry 4.0 [DEU2015] 
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The German Federal Office for Information Security publishes a list of the top 10 
threats to automation systems at regular intervals. The current issue [BSI2016a] iden-
tifies the threats given in Table 1 and their ranking. 
 
Rank Threat Fields of Activity 
1 Social engineering and phishing Humans, processes 
2 Introducing malware via removable media and 
external hardware 
Processes, technology 
3 Infection with malware via Internet and intranet Network, technology 
4 Incursion via remote maintenance access Processes, network 
5 Human misconduct and sabotage Humans, processes 
6 Control components connected to the Internet Network, technology 
7 Technical misconduct and force majeure Technology 
8 Compromising extranet and cloud components Network, technology 
9 “(Distributed) Denial of Service” attacks Networks, robustness 
10 Compromising smartphones in the production 
environment 
Humans, processes, 
technology 
Table 1: Top 10 Threats, Augmented with Fields of Activity 
 
It is clear that the top 10 threats given can be divided into different types of attacks 
with associated fields of activity. Attacks can occur through different routes, e.g. over 
the network or via compromised components (USB sticks, smartphones), but also 
through social engineering or phishing. Overloading components or networks with a 
flood of meaningless requests (Denial of Service, Distributed Denial of Service) also 
constitutes one type of attack. On the basis of the threats described, the next section 
will now derive the fields of activity for implementing an IT security concept for pro-
duction facilities. 
2.3. Fields of Activity for IT Security in Production Areas 
To clarify the fields of activity, the author has added a column to Table 1 on the right 
with fields of activity. Individual issues can be associated with one or more fields of 
activity, which are described briefly below: 
 
 Humans: Humans operate and monitor the production facility and should en-
sure its security. At the same time, humans represent a vulnerability for IT se-
curity. They may unintentionally allow third parties access to the facility via so-
cial engineering and phishing. In cases of misconduct or sabotage, humans in-
tentionally or unintentionally compromise the IT security of the facility. 
 Technology: The technology used (control components, network compo-
nents) must be protected against attacks. Known vulnerabilities must be elimi-
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nated promptly. Regular communication with the manufacturer of the compo-
nents, e.g. by subscribing to security alerts, is advisable. 
 Processes: Not all aspects of IT security can be addressed through technology. 
In many cases, corresponding processes (rules, regulations) must be defined in 
addition to the technology. Employees must be trained regularly in these pro-
cesses. Compliance with the processes must be monitored, and any miscon-
duct that occurs must be penalized. Thus this point is related to the point 
“Humans”. 
 Network: Although the communication network of a production facility be-
longs under Technology, it is listed here separately. In many cases, the network 
represents the gateway for attacks. Particular attention is necessary here in or-
der to isolate the production network sufficiently well from the rest of the cor-
porate network and from the Internet in particular. 
 Robustness: “Denial of Service” attacks and “Distributed Denial of Service” at-
tacks are usually directed against a company via the Internet and strike the 
outer perimeter of the company first. Even if an attack must penetrate addi-
tional perimeters in order to break through to the production facility, automa-
tion systems still must exhibit a certain robustness against overload situations. 
 
 
The fields of activity described show that IT security for production facilities is not 
exclusively a technical problem. Besides technical problems (a vulnerability in the 
software; software patch not installed), other vulnerabilities may include organiza-
tional shortcomings (employees do not know that certain things are prohibited; rules 
on access to system components). 
 
The following fields of activity can be derived from this state of affairs. Besides the 
technical aspects and network communication aspects, the IT security concept of a 
production facility must also take social aspects (human behavior, human miscon-
duct) into account. Only a structured and layered approach that takes all aspects into 
account in an integrated way can ensure optimal protection of the facility. Such an 
approach is described by the term “Defense in Depth” [DHS2016b].  
 
The planning, implementation, and ongoing operation of a “Defense in Depth” con-
cept is no easy task for small and medium-sized enterprises in particular. A large 
amount of know-how is required in order to set one up. The resources required for 
this are usually scarce in the company, or the necessary training in this special do-
main is lacking. Therefore future concepts are needed that provide solutions for SMEs 
that are economical but still secure. 
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3. Standards, Guidelines, and Laws 
A number of standards and series of standards are available to companies in the area 
of IT security. The standards specify the state of the article and thus make a standard-
ized procedure possible for the design, implementation, operation, and certification 
of IT security systems. 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of IT Security Standards 
 
Figure 2 gives an overview of IT security standards. Besides standards for the office 
area (ISO 27000 series, IEC 15408, BSI basic protection catalogue [Grundschutzkata-
log]), standards that address production areas in particular (ISA SP99/IEC62443, IEC 
62351, VDI/VDE 2189) are also listed. The list is supplemented with a series of stand-
ards of manufacturer/user associations (PROFINET, EtherNet/IP, NAMUR) and au-
thorities (BSI, Homeland Security). 
 
The following sections provide an overview of the state of standardization. It first ex-
amines the general IT security standards. There then follows an overview of special 
standards for automation technology and recommendations of manufacturer organi-
zations. The section ends with future prospects of the IT Security Act. 
3.1. Standards for Office Areas 
IT security in office areas has been specified through corresponding standards for 
many years. The ISO 27000 series of standards provides a comprehensive set of 
standards that, besides the technical aspects, also describe the associated processes. 
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An overview of the series of standards can be found in [KER2016], for example. IT se-
curity systems can also be certified correspondingly according to the standard. The 
certification procedure can be found in [KER2013], for example. Certification accord-
ing to the ISO 27000 series of standards is considered complex and laborious. There-
fore, it is primarily companies that are considered especially exposed (banks, payment 
service providers) that are certified. SMEs usually do not have ISO 27000 certified IT 
security systems. 
 
On the basis of the ISO-27000 series of standards, the German Federal Office for In-
formation Security specifies a series of basic protection catalogues (Grundschutzkat-
alogen) [BSI2016c] that allow easier access to the standard. The BSI also provides ap-
propriate checklists and data entry forms. This gives SMEs easier access to the topic 
of IT security. 
 
With the [VDS_3473] guidelines, the VDS offers principles for cyber security in office 
areas tailored to the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. Certification ac-
cording to this standard is possible. The level of effort is tailored to the needs of small 
and medium-sized enterprises and significantly less than for certification according to 
the ISO-27000 series of standards. 
3.2. Standards for Production Areas 
The standards described in section  3.1 address IT security in office areas. This means 
the IT of a company that has no production facilities (e.g. banks), or the part of a 
company in which no production facilities are located (e.g., administration, sales, hu-
man resources, etc.). The requirements in office areas are prioritized as follows: confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability. Figure 3 shows the prioritization of these security 
objectives for office areas on the side. 
 
Figure 3: Prioritization of the Security Objectives for Office IT and Automation Technology 
 
The prioritization in the production area is different. As can be seen on the right side 
of Figure 3, the availability of the production facility has the highest priority, followed 
by the integrity of the facility. Confidentiality follows in third place. 
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Due to this prioritization and the real-time behavior required in many areas for pro-
duction facilities, the standards described in section  3.1 are inapplicable to the pro-
duction area, or only applicable to a limited extent. For this reason a series of stand-
ards that take the requirements of production into account is being developed. The 
following sections introduce the most important of these standards. 
3.2.1. IEC-62443 Series of Standards 
The IEC 62443 series of standards is being developed by the International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC) and the International Society of Automation (ISA). The 
initial work on the standard began in working group ISA SP99 and is currently being 
continued in a cooperation between IEC and ISA. Therefore, many documents still 
contain references to ISA working groups and documents. 
 
On the basis of the models and requirements of the ISO-27000 series of standards, 
the special requirements of IT security in production areas are taken into account in 
the IEC-62443 series of standards. Figure 4 shows the structure of the series of stand-
ards. 
 
 
Figure 4: Parts of the IEC 62443 [Image Source: Wikimedia Commons] 
 
The IEC 62443 series of standards consists of four main areas that are presented be-
low, including the associated standards:  
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 The “General” section of [IEC_62443_1_1] first defines terms, concepts, and 
models. The [IEC_62443_1_2] section defines all terms used in the standards. 
The [IEC_62443_1_3] section defines metrics for assessing IT security; section 
[IEC_62443_1_4] describes the security lifecycle and application cases. 
 
 The “Policies & Procedures” section describes the IT security management 
system and thus specifies the organization of IT security, followed by imple-
mentation aids. The part [IEC_62443_2_1] describes requirements on IT security 
management systems, e.g. the definition of security procedures. The part 
[IEC_62443_2_2] provides notes on how and in which domains these proce-
dures must be implemented. Updating automation system software – patching 
– is especially significant, since an incorrect procedure can lead to malfunc-
tions. Therefore, the standard gives patch management its own 
[IEC_62443_2_3]. The part [IEC_62443_2_4] addresses the use of service pro-
viders for commissioning and service from the point of view of IT security. 
 
 The “System” part describes the technical procedure. The part 
[IEC_62443_3_1]first describes the underlying technologies such as authenti-
cation, encryption, filtering, and logging. Part [IEC_62443_3_2] describes struc-
turing a facility into zones (isolated areas) and conduits (secure connections 
between the areas). In this way a facility with automation technology should be 
divided into sub-areas, which are in turn isolated from each other. Part 
[IEC_62443_3_3] defines a metric for assessing the security condition achieved 
by assigning the implemented solution a security level. 
 
 The “Component” part describes the requirements on the components and 
the associated development cycle. This part is aimed at the manufacturers of 
automation systems. Part [IEC_62443_4_1] specifies the development process 
that must be taken into account when developing components for automation 
technology. Topics such as “Security Management Process”, “Security Re-
quirement Specification”, “Secure Architecture Design”, and “Security Risk As-
sessment and Threat Modeling” are parts of the standard. Part [IEC_62443_4_2] 
describes the technical requirements for components of automation systems, 
applications, and functions. 
 
The standards have only been published in part so far. However, all parts of the series 
of standards are available in draft form at least. The current state of the work and the 
release status of the parts of the standard can be viewed at [ISA2016]. [KOB2016] 
gives an overview of the IEC 62443 series of standards and explains the relationships 
between the parts of the standards. The standards/draft standards described current-
ly comprise 1,018 printed pages (version of Nov. 2016). 
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3.2.2. VDI/VDE-2182 Series of Standards 
The VDI/VDE 2182 series of standards clarifies the topic of IT security for production 
facilities with practical examples for the manufacturing and process industry. The pro-
spects for manufacturers, integrators, and operators are addressed in the process. 
 
Part 1 of the [VDI_2182_1] standard first defines the essential terms of IT security for 
production facilities: 
 
 User 
o Person or application that can interact with the object of consideration. 
 Asset 
o All material and immaterial values of automation equipment, automa-
tion systems, machines, or production facilities that can be threatened 
and are worth protecting 
o Examples: SPS, formulas, interface functions, firmware 
 Threat 
o A situation or event that can lead to damage 
 Risk 
o Combination of probability and extent of damage 
 Risk reduction 
o Reduction of the probability of damage or level of damage by taking 
security measures 
 Vulnerability 
o Deficiency that allows a threat to become effective for the object of 
consideration 
 Originator 
o Authorized or unauthorized users whose actions can have intended or 
unintended negative effects on security objectives of an object of con-
sideration 
 
The standard then defines a procedural model with associated roles as shown in Fig-
ure 5. 
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Figure 5: Procedural Model According to [VDI_2182_1] 
 
The procedural model of VDI/VDE 2182 is based on a so-called “Plan–Do–Check–Act 
cycle” (PDCA).  
 
1. In an initial step, the assets of the facility, especially automation components, 
computers, etc., are identified and recorded. The result is a list of identified as-
sets.  
2. The cycle next requires identifying the threats that affect the assets. Threat 
scenarios are considered and documented in the process. VDI/VDE 2182 pro-
vides corresponding templates.  
3. As the third step the standard requires determining the relevant security ob-
jectives. The security objectives are derived from the threats, determined, and 
documented.  
4. The fourth step of the procedural module now provides for a risk assessment. 
Based on the threats and the identified security objectives, the probability of 
occurrence of the identified threats and associated potential damage are now 
described. An associated risk can be determined from the combination of 
probability of occurrence and level of damage. 
5. The result of the risk assessment identifies areas in which the existing risk is 
unacceptable. Risk reduction measures, so-called security measures, must be 
provided here and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness and economic via-
bility. 
6. The security measures are now selected on the basis of the considerations 
from step 5. The goal of this selection is to implement security measures to an 
economically reasonable extent while simultaneously achieving the necessary 
risk reduction. 
7. The following step provides for the implementation of the selected security 
measure. 
8. An audit of the described process is then conducted on the basis of the pre-
ceding steps. The documents created and the effectiveness of the described 
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security measures are determined in the process. The audit should be con-
ducted by persons who were not involved in the preceding steps. 
 
Since external events can alter the threat situation for a production facility, this pro-
cess should be repeated at specified intervals.  
 
SW tools that support recording and evaluating the assets are available to support 
the described process. For example, the German Federal Office for Information Secu-
rity provides the LARS tool [BSI2014a] . Homeland Security offers the CSET tool 
[ICS2016]. The INSA research project [GLA2015] is pursuing an an approach to auto-
mated threat analysis. 
 
The VDI/VDE-2182 series of standards specifies the process with respect to three 
roles: 
 
 Manufacturer: The manufacturers develop and sell the system components. 
They are responsible for the maintenance and service of the supplied compo-
nents (e.g. SW updates to eliminate security gaps) at the same time. 
 Integrator: The integrator is a service provider hired by the operator and is re-
sponsible for the planning and commissioning of a facility. Operators of facili-
ties often do not have sufficient resources for the planning and commissioning 
of new facilities or for carrying out the modifications to the facility. Thus use of 
integrators is frequently common practice. 
 Operator: The operator is responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
the facility. The operator may delegate maintenance tasks to maintenance ser-
vice providers. 
 
Parts 2 and 3 of VDI/VDE 2182 follow the described role concept. Part 2 describes the 
tasks according to the procedural model described in Part 1 for the roles of manufac-
turer [VDI_2182_2_1], integrator [VDI_2182_2_2], and operator [VDI_2182_2_3] on the 
example of a production facility in the area of manufacturing automation. Part 3 does 
this in the same way for a process automation facility [VDI_2128_3_1] [VDI_2128_3_2] 
[VDI_2182_3_3]. 
 
The VDI/VDE-2182 series of standards provides manufacturers, integrators, and oper-
ators with a basis for viewing the described PDCA procedural model with a focus on 
the respective responsibilities. The respective parts guide the reader through the pro-
cess on the basis of an actual example and show what form documentation of the 
results can take by providing checklists. 
3.2.3. VdS 3473-1– Part 2 
The guide to the interpretation and implementation of VdS 3473 for Industrial Auto-
mation Systems, VdS 3473-1 adresses specifically small and and medium-sized enter-
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prises and represents a supplement to the existing directive [VDS_3473]. Part 2 is ad-
dressed to SMEs that operate production facilities. The criteria necessary for imple-
mentation of an IT security strategy in production areas are described in a brief and 
perspicuous form.   
3.2.4. Guidelines of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) 
The German Federal Office for Information Security offers a series of guidelines in the 
domain of IT security for production facilities. The BSI publishes the top 10 threats to 
automation systems at regular intervals [BSI2016a]. In addition the BSI offers the ICS 
compendium [BSI2013] as an introduction to IT security of production facilities for 
facility operators. The document “Requirements on Network-compatible Industrial 
Components” [BSI2014c] is addressed to the manufacturers of automation compo-
nents and specifies requirements on components of automation systems. Besides 
these basic documents, the BSI publishes case studies at regular intervals which ad-
dress special issues. For example, there are case studies for attacks [BSI2014d], an 
example for employing service technicians, [BSI2014b] and one for IP cameras 
[BSI2016b]. In addition, the BSI offers LARS-ICS [BSI2014a] as a software tool that 
supports the PDCA cycle described in section  3.2.2. 
 
The topic of remote service and remote diagnose is particularly significant, since 
communication links to third parties here can be operated from the automation do-
main. The BSI devotes a separate document [BSI-CS_108] to this topic.  
3.2.5. Guidelines of Manufacturer Organizations 
Industrial communication systems such as PROFINET or EtherNet/IP represent an im-
portant part of automation infrastructure. For this reason the various manufacturer 
organizations have addressed the topic of IT security in production facilities and pub-
lished corresponding guidelines. For example, the PROFIBUS user organization offers 
guidelines for PROFINET [PNO2013]. A comparable document from ODVA is available 
for EtherNet/IP [ODV2011]. An IT security section has already been incorporated into 
the current edition of the standard for the BACNET bus protocol [ISO16484-5] used in 
building automation. In addition there is a security model for OPC UA in the form of a 
technical report of the IEC [IEC_62541-2]. The German Federal Office for Information 
Security has evaluated this concept and given a basically positive assessment 
[BSI2016d], [WIC2016]. 
3.2.6. Industry-specific Standards 
Besides the manufacturer associations, user associations are also addressing the topic 
of IT security. The User Association of Automation Technology in Process Industries 
(NAMUR) has published both recommendations for IT security [NA_115] in existing 
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facilities and an outlook for future requirements [NE_153] related to IT security in au-
tomation systems of the process industry.  
 
Industry-specific standards are also available for the maritime sector in the form e.g. 
of standards of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) [ABS2016] and of the Baltic 
and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) [BIM2016].  
 
The standards of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation can be refer-
enced for the “power supply and power distribution” sector. A series of cyber security 
standards are available here [NERC2016]. It should be noted that the power supply 
sector in particular is also characterized by national statutory regulations. 
 
It is only possible to provide a limited outlook for industry-specific standards here, 
which makes no claim to completeness. 
3.2.7. Summary of Standards 
All the documents described above are based on the “Plan–Do–Check–Act cycle” 
(PDCA cycle). As described in section  3.2.2, the assets are recorded, the threats are 
identified, the risks are assessed, and the necessary measures are derived, imple-
mented, and verified in a structured process. A further shared criterion is establishing 
an IT security strategy in the company, which requires an integrated and comprehen-
sive view. Besides technical issues, organizational and personnel issues in particular 
must also be taken into account. 
 
In terms of the technical implementation, the existing standards take a Defense-in-
Depth strategy as the starting point. A series of supplemental measures protect the 
assets by sealing them off against threats from outside. 
 
The existing concepts will have to be expanded and improved with the introduction 
of Industry 4.0. [NIE2014_1] specifies a series of additional challenges which must be 
addressed in future in connection with IT security in production areas. In particular 
these are: 
 Protection against internal perpetrators 
 Increasing communication even beyond the boundaries of the company 
 Network access control 
 Securing communication by cryptographic means 
 
Section  5 will address and discuss this issue once again. 
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3.3. The IT Security Act 
The IT Security Act (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz) [ITSichG2015] legislates requirements on the 
IT security of critical infrastructures (KRTIS). The definition of critical infrastructures is 
governed by a separate ordinance [BSI-KritisV]. The following infrastructures fall un-
der the law in the current edition of this ordinance: power supply, gas supply, fuel 
and heating oil supply, district heating supply, wastewater disposal, and drinking wa-
ter supply. The ordinance specifies threshold values for the supply services. For ex-
ample, sewage treatment plants with a population equivalent of 500,000 or above 
and power plants with a nominal capacity of 420 MW or above fall under the ordi-
nance. It is to be expected that the ordinance will expand the group of infrastructures 
addressed in the future.  
 
Within the scope of the IT Security Act, a reporting office for incidents is established 
at the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and a reporting obligation 
specified for critical incidents.  
 
The law also stipulates the following: 
 
“Operators of critical infrastructures are obligated to take organizational and 
technical precautions within at most two years of the effective date of the ordi-
nance according to §10 paragraph 1 to prevent disruptions of the availability, in-
tegrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of their information technology systems, 
components, or processes that are critical for the functionality of the critical in-
frastructures they operate” [ITSichG2015]. 
 
Furthermore, the operators of critical infrastructures are obligated to establish a con-
tact point and must demonstrate compliance with the requirements. In addition, 
[ITSichG2015] summarizes a series of further requirements on other laws that relate 
to the issue of critical infrastructures and IT security. 
 
The legal framework will mean that the operators of critical infrastructures will in-
creasingly turn to their suppliers in order to obtain information and, in some cases, 
technical improvements to bolster components.  
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4. Measures for the Implementation of IT Security in 
Production Areas 
Section  3 provides an overview of the relevant standards in order to derive a corre-
sponding procedure from them. However, the problem for SMEs is that these sets of 
standards are very extensive and still incomplete in some cases. Therefore, it is hard 
for SMEs to reach an assessment in connection with their own companies. A quick 
check (e.g., www.vds-quick-check.de), which provides an initial classification of the 
company in terms of IT security, can provide a first estimate. There is one check avail-
able for office areas and one for production areas.  
 
To allow an easy entry point into IT security in production areas for SMEs, a 10-point 
plan is proposed below for establishing IT security in production areas. These ten 
points are: 
 
1. Management commitment 
2. Organization of the responsibilities and processes 
3. Creating guidelines 
4. Training staff 
5. Acquiring and providing knowledge 
6. Identifying, evaluating, and protecting the assets 
7. Regulating external access to production facilities 
8. Data backup 
9. Handling malfunctions and failures 
10. Handling IT security incidents 
 
The following sections will address these ten points and describe measures necessary 
for establishing an IT security process in production areas. The literature usually has a 
strong focus on points 6 and 7. However, it should be noted that IT security must be 
viewed as an integrated process incorporating all these points. 
4.1. Management Commitment 
IT security must be established in the company as a top-down process. Implementa-
tion in the company only makes sense with corresponding commitment from the 
management. For this purpose the management should prepare an IT security strate-
gy for the company (or have one prepared) that includes the office and production 
areas. The strategy should define clear objectives and corresponding responsibilities. 
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It is advisable to define a project for the initiation of the process and provide it with 
the necessary internal and, if applicable, external resources. The procedure described 
here is comparable to the introduction of a quality management process. 
4.2. Organization of the Responsibilities and Processes 
After the start of the project, the management should define corresponding respon-
sibilities. Since the technical systems in the office and production areas are often ad-
ministered separately, one IT security officer should be appointed for the office area 
and one for the production area. A single person can handle this task if necessary. 
However, in that case it is necessary to ensure that this person has the necessary 
knowledge of the office and production areas. The two officers should form the in-
formation security team together with additional employees and a management rep-
resentative. This team is responsible for the implementation of the IT security strategy 
and for handling malfunctions, failures, and IT security incidents. 
 
Corresponding staff should be assigned to this topic/project in order to ensure con-
tinuous work. The reporting channels must be defined. Rules should also be estab-
lished for the delegation of tasks and involvement of the top management. It should 
be noted that suppliers and system integrators must also be included in the process-
es. 
4.3. Creating Guidelines 
The company should address the topic of IT security in corresponding guidelines that 
impose basic rules of conduct on the staff. Only if the staff know what is expected of 
them in connection with IT security can they behave accordingly. This includes speci-
fying the conduct of employees in connection with (non)use of private devices. 
 
For automation systems, especially the installation of software, the introduction of 
software updates, and the prior verification of software updates must be defined, and 
the scope of the security equipment (failsafe systems) must be described. 
 
The guidelines should also describe the information flow when staff are absent and 
the sharing of access codes. It should also make clear that abuse will be monitored 
and that penalties should be expected for misconduct. As in section  4.2, specifications 
should also be made for suppliers and integrators. 
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4.4. Training Staff 
Staff are a decisive factor for IT security. Adequate know-how and training of staff can 
make a decisive contribution to IT security in the company.  
 
Employees should sign confidentiality agreements when joining the company. In the 
onboarding phase, new employees should be given instruction on the IT security 
guidelines and additional guidelines if applicable. The staff’s knowledge should be 
kept up to date with training and instruction. 
 
Corresponding measures should be taken when employees leave the company. VPN 
access of these employees should be locked and passwords changed. This also ap-
plies to shift access. 
4.5. Acquiring and Providing Knowledge 
A report in the specialist press in 2013 indicated vulnerabilities in components of au-
tomation systems that are accessible via the Internet [STA2013b]. A reexamination 
two years later revealed that a large proportion of the systems remain unsecured 
[STA2015]. The software updates provided by the manufacturer were not installed in 
the system. This case makes clear that it is essential for the operators of automation 
systems to inform themselves of known vulnerabilities of their systems and correct 
them. 
 
For this reason, a process that ensures acquisition of corresponding, up-to-date in-
formation for the company should be established in the company. Possible sources 
for acquiring information on vulnerabilities may include: 
 
 Information from the manufacturers of the automation systems. For example: 
o ABB [ABB2016] 
o Siemens [SIE2016] 
o WAGO: [WAG2017] 
 Information from ICS-CERT (US Homeland Security) on known vulnerabilities of 
automation systems [DHS2016a] 
 Databases of known vulnerabilities. For example: 
o CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [MIT2016] 
o Open Indicators of Compromise (Open IOC) [MAN2016] 
 
It must be ensured that the knowledge is up to date. In some cases it is possible to 
subscribe to alerts (notifications from the manufacturer about vulnerabilities that 
have been discovered) via an email distribution list for certain systems. Individuals 
 22 
 
who evaluate these notifications and derive measures from them for the company 
should be designated in the company. 
 
Besides specific knowledge concerning known vulnerabilities, employees’ general 
knowledge should be established and kept up to date through awareness-raising, 
training, and further education. 
4.6. Identifying, Evaluating, and Protecting the Assets 
This section describes how the assets of a production facility are systematically rec-
orded, evaluated, and secured if necessary. The procedure here follows the VDI 2182 
series of standards. The IEC 62443 series of standards describes a comparable proce-
dure. The steps shown in Figure 5 are taken for the analysis of the automation sys-
tem. Section  3.2.2 describes the “Plan–Do–Check–Act cycle” (PDCA) and the necessary 
steps. 
 
The result of this analysis is: 
 
 List of all assets 
 Breakdown of the threats that affect the assets in the form of a threat matrix 
 List of all relevant security objectives in the form of a threat matrix with rele-
vant security objectives. 
 List of the assessed risks that affect the assets 
o The VDI 2182 series of standards provides suggestions for compiling 
such lists. 
 List of possible security measures and assessment of their effectiveness and 
costs 
 List of the selected security measures to be taken 
 Report on the implementation of the security measures 
 Results of the process audit for evaluating the effectiveness of the selected 
measures 
 
 
Typical security measures that result from the process described usually follow from a 
so-called Defense-in-Depth concept [DHS2016b]. 
The following figures show examples of selected components of a Defense-in-Depth 
concept. 
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Figure 6: Example Facility with Office and Production Areas 
 
Figure 6 shows a production facility consisting of two parts. The control room area is 
located above the production facility. The office area is shown above that. The com-
pany is assumed to be separated from the Internet by a firewall. An Internet connec-
tion is required for acquiring software updates or storing data in the cloud, for exam-
ple. 
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Figure 7: Perimeter Security 
 
As the first measure taken, the entire premises can be secured against intrusion from 
outside, e.g. with a fence Figure 7. This measure prevents unauthorized individuals 
from accessing the factory grounds and represents the initial barrier against attackers. 
However, in one known incident a cyber attacker was able to get over a double fence 
and cripple a power plant with a cyber attack [PAN2008] This means that the fence 
must be only one of many interconnected measures. 
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Figure 8: Modified Firewall and Building Access Monitoring 
 
Figure 8 shows a modified firewall configuration as the next security measure. This is 
now configured in such a way that no access to the automation system is permissible 
from outside the company. At the same time necessary connections for the office 
area are permitted for the operation of the facility. Access monitoring for the building 
in which the production facility is located is installed as an additional measure. These 
measures provide a data barrier between the production area and both the office 
area and the Internet. In addition to the fence around the factory grounds, a second, 
narrower access control is implemented. 
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Figure 9: Isolating the Production Area 
 
Figure 9 shows a further subdivision of the production facility. The production facility 
is divided into two sub-areas (yellow background). Each of these areas is itself isolat-
ed from the maintenance area (ocher-colored background) by a firewall. In addition, 
the components in the sub-areas could be further secured by installing them in a 
locked switch cabinet, for example. 
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Figure 10: Encryption of the Communication 
 
Figure 10 shows the security measure for a wireless access point through encryption. 
Even if off-the-shelf WLAN access points offer standard encryption, it it is important 
to select a sufficiently secure procedure and sufficiently strong passwords. 
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Figure 11: Network Monitoring 
 
Figure 11 shows monitoring, e.g. via a honey pot or a network monitoring system, as 
the final measure. The honey pot is a monitoring system that masquerades as an easy 
victim, lures in possible attackers, and documents attacks. A network monitoring sys-
tem (Network Intrusion Detection System – NIDS – or Intrusion Detection System – 
IDS) monitors the network traffic for anomalies. 
 
The measures presented here represent a few examples. Further measures exist which 
we will not go into here for reasons of space. Examples include: 
 
 Virus protection 
 Application whitelisting 
 Access restriction for portable media 
 Setting up demilitarized zones (DMZs) for introducing software updates 
 Authentication of network participants 
 Restricting access to the network by turning off unused network ports 
 
Although this part of the 10 point program is the most laborious, the other points 
should not be neglected in comparison with this part. 
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4.7. Regulating External Access to Production Facilities 
External access to production facilities for remote diagnosis and remote maintenance 
purposes is an especially critical process from the point of view of IT security. For this 
reason, this topic is described in a separate section. 
 
Known incidents of this type trace back to the use of remote access [BYR2009] 
[SAN2016]. For this reason special security measures apply to such access. [BSI-
CS_108] provides a good orientation. In it the BSI describes the basic procedures for 
setting up remote access. The BSI’s basic guidelines are: 
 
 Setting up a uniform solution. This standardizes the hardware and processes 
used, reducing the administrative effort. 
 Locating the remote maintenance components in an upstream zone (DMZ). 
 No blanket access to an entire (sub)network, but rather only to dedicated end-
points. 
 Establishing the connection from the company to the outside 
 Using dedicated systems that can only be used for this purpose 
 Current versions of established protocols such as IPsec, SSH, or SSL/TLS are 
used exclusively in order to establish a tunnel between two end-
points/networks. 
 The connection between the company and diagnosis point must be encrypted. 
Sufficiently strong cryptographic processes are used for encryption. 
 Only one user should be provided per account. It is essential to avoid group 
accounts. 
 Use of multi-factor authentication method 
 Appropriate specifications should be created and followed for use of pass-
words. 
 Mechanisms for detection of attacks on password-based authentication meth-
ods should be used. 
 Performing a risk analysis 
 Following the minimality principle (as few connections as possible) 
 Establishing processes for enabling and blocking access 
 Specifications for staff who perform remote maintenance, e.g. prohibition on 
performing remote maintenance via mobile phones 
 Restricting access to a specified timeframe; automatic disconnection after a 
certain time span 
 Switching on and evaluating protocol functions 
 
The document referenced contains even more information. This document merely 
reproduces the essential points. 
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4.8. Data Backup 
[ZET2016] and [SAN2016] describe the attack on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015. 
This attack included making the hard drives of control systems unusable with the help 
of the “KillDisk” program. Triggering a total data loss is thus a method of attack al-
ready known today. Therefore data backup takes on particular significance in produc-
tion areas. 
 
A concept for handling a catastrophic data loss (deletion of all data pools including 
operating systems) should be developed. Regular full backup of all data pools of the 
automation system is part of a data backup concept. The recovery routines should be 
documented and tested. 
 
In view of the further spread of ransomware such as Locky [MC 2016], the backup 
systems should only be connected to the computer network for the duration of the 
backup. Furthermore, it should not be possible to modify or delete the data of the 
backup system from the computer network. 
4.9. Handling Malfunctions and Failures 
It is necessary to handle malfunctions and failures rapidly and efficiently in order to 
resume operation quickly after such an incident. It is essential to define the term 
clearly. The alert type and alert channels should be determined and documented. It is 
necessary to specify which types of incidents fall under this category. A plan for 
communication with the outside should also be drawn up. The reactions to malfunc-
tions and failures should be specified, and procedural models (recovery plans) are 
necessary for handling such incidents.  
 
When incidents occur, restoring proper operation initially has the highest priority. 
After that, the causes are investigated, the damage is documented, and follow-up to 
prevent future incidents is performed. 
4.10. Handling IT Security Incidents 
To begin with, the malfunctions described in section  4.9 can be of a general nature. 
The IT security incidents form a sub-category of these incidents that require special 
treatment. First of all, the procedure described in section  4.9 applies to IT security 
incidents as a general rule. In addition, preventive measures to detect and avert IT 
security incidents are advisable. In a survey by the SANS Institute [SAN2015], 15 % of 
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the companies surveyed said that they had needed more than one month to detect 
an attack. 
 
For this reason, further measures such a network access monitoring, analysis (possibly 
automatic) of log files, honey pots, or network monitoring systems (Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems) make sense. In any case, an internal company reporting system should 
be set up to record and handle IT security incidents. 
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5. Outlook 
The 10 point action plan presented in section  4 offers an initial approach to imple-
mentation of IT security in the production area. Although it is appropriate for imple-
menting sufficient protection for a production facility, there are still some deficiencies 
that will emerge more prominently in the context of Industry 4.0. 
 
State-of-the-art measures have the following deficiencies: 
 
 The concepts focus heavily on defence against the “outside.” [HAR2015] shows 
that employees represent the largest group of perpetrators, accounting for 
25 % of the incidents. Therefore, future concepts must concentrate more than 
they have on protection against internal perpetrators. 
 Any attacker who has access to an unsecured network switch can introduce a 
device into the network and participate in the communication. [LIN2014] con-
tains an impressive description of how an attacker was able to get control of 
an automation system through unsecured network access. 
 The increase in horizontal and vertical integration in the context of Industry 4.0 
will mean that the classic security measures will only remain effective to a lim-
ited degree. The number of network nodes will grow; the effort for ensuring IT 
security will increase. 
 
In [NE_153], NAMUR described requirements on future automation systems. The fun-
damental principle is the “Security by Design“ approach. Instead of sealing the devic-
es off, in the future security functions will be integrated into the devices that will 
permit secure communication even under real-time conditions. Essential require-
ments for such a concept can be found in [NIE2014_1] or [NIE2014_2]. 
 
However, for implementing IT security today, the established measures should be 
taken, especially “low-hanging fruit” – goals that can be achieved with limited effort. 
A significant increase in security can be achieved with minimal effort in such cases. 
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